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Abstract. In recent years international investors are increasing the focus on the 
social consequences of their investments along with its financial returns. The mi-
crofinance sector, considered as an asset class is a relatively young concept but the 
microfinance industry is experiencing a tremendous growth and has a high poten-
tial for the future. Today most social responsible investments in microfinance are 
performed through loans or fixed income structured finance vehicles. The possi-
bilities to invest in the equity tranche of the industry are still scarce since the 
number of listed microfinance institutions is reduced and the private equity in-
vestments are limited and difficult to reach for the majority of investors.  In this 
document we present a study on the characteristics of the MFIs and we try to shed 
some light on this subsector of the equity assets universe that may become im-
portant in the coming future. 
Keywords: Microfinance institutions, Micro-credits, Financial Institutions, Equi-
ty; Stock Exchange 
 
 
1.1 The Boundaries of the Microfinance Market 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the microcredit movement started by Grammeen 
bank and others led to the emergence of nongovernmental organizations that pro-
vided small loans for the poor. In the 1990s, a number of these institutions trans-
formed themselves into formal financial (Brand 2010).  Microfinance Institutions 
(MFI) are different from Commercial Financial Institutions mainly because are fo-
cused on providing funds (mainly in debt format) to poor people to invest in capi-
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tal goods, based on the premise that the poor have skills that remain unutilized or 
underutilized but suffer from a lack of capital and cannot access to funding for 
their business (Feasley 2011).  
According the World Bank Development Indicators of 2009 there are 4.5 bil-
lion inhabitants in low income and middle lower income countries of which about 
2.3 billion people have limited access to financial services. Some studies estimate 
that 60% of population have real demand for financial services (Brand 2010, Cole 
et at 2009), this may give an estimated total number of potential microfinance cli-
ents on 1.3b people.  
 According to the MIX (MicroFinance Information Exchange, 
www.mixmarket.org) report 2010: 
 
 The total loan portfolio of 1,896 MFIs reporting to the MIX database was 
at the end of 2009 of $142 billion, which could be used as an estimation 
of the total microfinance market reached today. 
 The total number of borrowers was 93 million, therefore the average loan 
amount per borrower was about $1,500. 
 
Using a conservative approach for the total sector demand, the figures stated 
by MIX indicate that currently only a small fraction of the 1.3 billion potential mi-
crofinance clients are reached.  An extrapolation of the current loan levels to 
1.3billion borrowers would show a total maximum theoretical market asset size of 
$1.9trillion. Other researchers (Dieckmann 2008, 2009) using a much more re-
strictive social approach of microfinance, estimate that to fully satisfy the global 
demand for microfinance assets, the MFIs would need a total liabilities mix of 
debt, equity, deposits and subordinated debt of approximately $300b.  In both cas-
es it seems that only a small fraction of the total microfinance market is covered at 
present.  
 
1.2 The Funding of the Micro Finance Institutions 
According to the CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) Microfinance 
survey 2010 and the MIX, the total amount of funds committed by international 
investors (Non For Profit and For Profit) to MFIs worldwide is about $60b in the 
form of debt, guarantees, equity  and other instruments. Three main types of fund-
ing instruments can be distinguished (Brandt 2010, Gonzalez, 2010a): 
 
 Own funds and equity 
 Debt in the form of grants, bonds or loans. Most MFIs cannot access the 
standard debt capital markets but MFIs can access the multilateral organ-
izations and international development agencies (Non For Profit) and the 
For Profit specialized international investors: private institutional inves-
tors, international banks and Microfinance Investment Vehicles  
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 Retail deposits.  
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Fig. 1 Committed Funding Amount by Instrument for MFIs (average).  Source CGAP 2010 
 
1.2.1 Securitization 
 
Structured Finance Vehicles (SFV) were created in an attempt to market more eas-
ily the microfinance securities. The SFVs repackage a pool of loans and structure 
them in a way easer to buy from international investors, creating different seniori-
ty tranches in the event of default, offering different risk-return profiles adapted to 
investors that sometimes cannot face directly the risk presented by the MFIs.  In 
other cases the MFI sells part of its loan portfolio, in the form of an asset backed 
security (ABS) through the true or synthetic sale of the assets (microcredits) in the 
balance sheet of the MFIs, delinking the credit risk of the originator from the cred-
it risk of the assets themselves (Gupta et al 2010b).  The benefits of the securitiza-
tion of loans for the MFIs are: 
 
 Expands the capacity of the MFI by selling part of its balance sheet 
 MFIs can concentrate its efforts on originating loans and collecting pay-
ments 
 MFIs diversify its funding sources 
 MFIs remove risky assets from its balance sheet 
 
 
 
1.3 THE SIZE OF THE MFI EQUITY MARKET 
 
The vast majority of the funds committed to MFIs are in form of debt. The equity 
of the MFIs is provided mainly locally in each country but four main groups of in-
ternational equity investors can be distinguished (Brand 2010, Gonzalez 2010a): 
 
1. Government development agencies, international development and su-
pranational non for profit investors that normally invest in the form of 
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private equity investments. The aggregate equity portfolio of these inves-
tors was valued at the beginning of 2010 on $761m (based on the CGAP 
MIV 2010 survey and the MIX). 
2. MIVs and specialized investment funds with a focus on microfinance eq-
uity. Their total equity assets under management were estimated to have 
grown from $670m in 2007 to $1.9b at the beginning of 2010 (based on 
the CGAP MIV 2010 survey and the MIX). 
3. Large commercial private equity firms, such as Sequoia Capita, Legatum 
and others, the total amount invested by these institutions is estimated in 
excess of $400m at the beginning of 2010  (Rozeira de Mariz et al 2010). 
4. US pension funds such as TIAA CREF, and Netherlands ABP and 
PGGM which perform asset allocations as part of their socially responsi-
ble investment strategies and as a diversification. Their commitments are 
estimated to be $700m at the beginning of 2010 (Rozeira de Mariz et al 
2010). 
 
The four groups of international investors above give a total amount invested 
in microfinance equity of nearly $3.7b at the beginning of 2010. As a reference for 
comparison, the total microfinance loan portfolio registered by the 2010 Mix sur-
vey showed an amount close to $142b.  The total deposit base of the MFI institu-
tions registered in the MIX was $27b. The asset base of the MFIs registered in the 
MIX database totalled assets of $180b. The funds and liabilities needed to match 
the assets should be composed of debt raised internationally, local debt, grants and 
donations, local government funds, cooperative funds, local equity, international 
equity investments and deposits from clients. Therefore the numbers show that 
most of this equity is funded locally or thanks to the local public sector and only a 
fraction ($3.7b) is raised through international investors. The space for growth is 
important and International investors should play a relevant role in the future. 
 
 
1.3.1 Listed MFIs 
 
The MFI is a young subsector of the financial institutions world and therefore the 
number of listed MFI globally is reduced. Under a restricted selection, there are 
six listed financial institutions that may be, in our view, considered MicroFinance 
Institutions: 
 
SKS Microfinance   SKSMICRO:IN (India) 
Compartamos Banco  COMPARTO:MM (México)  
Equity Group Kenya  EQTY:NK (Kenya) 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia  BBRI:IJ (Indonesia)   
Brac Bank   BRAC:BD (Bangladesh) 
Financiera Independencia   FNCRF:MM (México) 
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1.4 COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MFIs 
 
One of the objectives of this document is to define the specific characteristics of 
the MFIs that could signal that the MFIs are a subset of the Financial Institutions 
equity asset class.  
 
1.4.1 Social Objectives 
 
The MFIs provide financial services to the people previously unbanked, and help 
on the funding of the microenterprises that previously lacked of this support (Gup-
ta et al 2010a) (Rozeira de Mariz et al 2009). Despite some criticism there is a 
general consensus about the very positive social benefits of microfinance for poor 
societies (Khandkeher 2008). 
 
1.4.2 Reliable Debt Funding  
 
MFIs attract soft lending public organizations, supranationals and socially respon-
sible investors. These loans received by the MFIs tend to be: 
 Below market rates (for the same risk profile) 
 Longer maturities. The average maturity of the loans to MFIs from a in-
ternational development organization is 60 months (Rozeira de Mariz 
2009)  
 Loans are easily rolled over and emergency liquidity lines are available 
 
1.4.3 Business Model 
 
MFIs asset and liability management enjoys a favourable duration mismatch, since 
their assets are short term (loans typically with maturities of less than one year) 
and liabilities are long term. Additionally MFIs client base operate in sectors of 
the basic economy, concentrated in the production or acquisition of essential 
products for local consumption. These sectors are less exposed to international 
economic adverse movements.  It seems that MFIs are reaching an enormous part 
of the global economy that is more stable and that was previously unreachable. 
 
1.4.4 Stable Deposit Base 
 
Globally, as much as 37% of the balance sheet of the MFIs reporting to the MIX 
and CGAP is funded through deposits, most of them from its own client base. But 
not all the MFIs in all the jurisdictions have the ability to raise deposits from cus-
tomers. The ability to raise deposits should give MFIs more resilience against fu-
ture market movements. 
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1.4.5 Low Financial Leverage 
 
In general MFIs have lower leverage than traditional banks (when the leverage is 
defined as Total Equity/Total Assets, lower leverage means a higher ratio), this is 
probably due to the immaturity of the sector and the scarcity of standard debt 
funding for MFIs (Brand 2010). According to the BIS the 15 year average Total 
Equity/Total Assets (leverage) of the developed nations banks reporting to BIS is 
5.4%. This leverage ratio is close to 22% for MFIs reporting to the MIX. 
 
1.4.6 Relatively High ROE 
 
The RoE reveals how much profit a company obtained in comparison to the total 
amount of shareholder equity on the balance sheet, but this ratio is influenced by 
the capital structure of the company. The more leveraged a company the higher 
the ROE is. Despite the fact that most MFIs have a social objective, the RoE of the 
MFIs that are profitable tend to be very high (Feasley 2011). And most important 
the financial leverage of the MFIs is very low compared to standard banks. 
 
1.4.7 High Interest Margin 
 
MFIs have higher net interest margins (Feasley 2011) than commercial banks 
driven by the fact that the interests rate charged to its client on average are higher 
due the scarcity of competition, the informal lenders offer less quality and the bor-
rowers are very robust microenterprises (Gupta et al 2010b, Mersland et at 2011) 
 
1.4.8 Strong Asset Quality 
 
Statistically MFIs have stronger asset quality than global commercial banks and 
that emerging markets mainstream banks (Gonzalez 2007). The average write-off 
ratio from 1996 to 2009 for all the MFIs reporting to the MIX was 0.51%. Not-
withstanding at the beginning of 2010 the write off ratio sharply increased to 
0.80%. The write-off ratio of the UK banks on the first half of 2010 was 1.5%, ac-
cording to the Bank of England statistics. 
 
1.4.9 Risk Management Techniques 
 
Because the clients of the MFIs generally do not posses collateral as a guarantee 
for the loans, MFIs issue loans that are given for entrepreneurial activities and 
lending decisions are based on personal characteristics, credit history, group pres-
sure and business cash flow, instead on collaterals, business capital or holdings. In 
order to encourage the repayment of the microcredits, MFIs involve the communi-
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ty, group lending (Feasley 2011). One of the most powerful tools used in the loan 
concession process is the shared liability group (group lending), jointly with 
neighbours, clients and providers and social pressure. Other risk management 
techniques are: 
 Small loan amounts 
 Borrower diversification 
 Large client base 
 Short loan maturities 
 Very small proportion of consumer loans, MFIs concentrate mostly on 
microenterprises lending 
 
 
1.5 MFIs Capital and the Financial Crisis 
 
The MFI sector earned its reputation as a countercyclical industry in the Asian Fi-
nancial crisis of the late 1990 (Patten 2001) but recent worldwide shows that the 
delinquency levels expressed as the PAR30 increased from January 2008 to Janu-
ary.  MFIs low leverage ratio (high proportion of equity against total assets), the 
fact that the average maturity of the liabilities is longer and more stable than the 
average maturity of assets increase its stability against crisis. Additionally MFIs 
keep a high proportion of benefits as loss reserves and maintain a very prudent 
dividend policy. In general solvency is not a concern for listed MFIs whose ratios 
are very strong (Hamilton et al 2009). Leverage or equity over asset ratios in 2010 
(Total Equity/Total Assets) reached 23.2%. And for profit international investors 
have demonstrated their commitment in the financial crisis providing new equity 
when required and not cutting losses.  As a comparison, solvency in developed 
countries measured as Tier I levels vary from 7% to 14% and measured as total 
Equity/Total Assets is in the range of 3.7% to 5% (MIX database survey 2010) 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
A further strong growth in the Microfinance industry is expected in the coming 
years since globally a very large number of poor people and microenterprises are 
underserved in terms of financial services and in particular in terms of loan prod-
ucts. Microfinance can be considered as one of the new frontiers of the global 
banking industry.  
MFIs have a set of characteristics that could make them different to other fi-
nancial institutions. These attributes may make them an interesting diversification 
asset subclass for international equity investors. Presently, international for-profit 
investors have very few ways of investing in microfinance equity. Most of the eq-
uity of the MFI equity is funded locally or thanks to the local public sector, our es-
timates show that only a fraction of the MFI equity are investments from interna-
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tional investors. The space for growth is important and international investors 
should play a relevant role in the future, but this requires listing in stock exchang-
es. The listing in stock markets can provide the MFIs with a new source of capital 
to maintain growth and to expand lending and therefore to reach new microfinance 
borrowers and help the development of the poorest population. The stock ex-
change listing should also drive the MFIs towards a more professional manage-
ment, more transparency and to follow stricter regulations.  
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tions 
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Abstract. Compared to the size of the microfinance market, the number of Micro-
finance Institutions that are professionally ran like commercial banks is still 
scarce, and even more scarce are the MFI listed in public stock exchanges. This 
document focuses on four listed MFIs and reviews its business model and funding 
sources. The document also analyses the market price evolution of the listed 
shares and investigates whether investors are assigning a premium to the MFIs 
compared with its respective market indices. 
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1.1 Listed Microfinance Institutions 
Historically stock exchanges have been one of the most important sources of capi-
tal for Financial Institutions, that have used them extensively since the banking 
business requires dynamic capital buffers to expand the operations in growth 
times, and to strengthen the balance sheet in economic downturns. But Micro-
finance Institutions (MFI) in its modern format are a relative new subsector of the 
banking industry; born in the seventies, its expansion took place in the first decade 
of the XXI century, when raising debt was easy. Most of the MFIs in operation are 
yet in their early stages or work in an informal way. Only a reduced number of 
MIFs can be considered as professionally run institutions. Notwithstanding the 
sector is growing at rates of 30% every year, according to the MIX2. Presently the 
number of listed MFIs in global stock exchanges is small compared to the size of 
the microfinance industry, which in terms of loan amounts is estimated to be close 
to $142 billion according to the MIX database gathering information from more 
than 1,890 MFIs operating around the world. Our research has identified only six 
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listed financial institutions globally that can be considered MFIs using the MIX 
and CGAP3 criteria SKS Microfinance, listed in the Indian stock exchange; Com-
partamos Banco, in the Mexican stock exchange; Equity Group Kenya, in the 
Kenyan stock exchange; Bank Rakyat Indonesia, in the Indonesian stock ex-
change; Brac Bank, in the Bangladeshi stock exchange; Financiera Independen-
cia, in the Mexican stock exchange. In the following pages four out of the above 
(SKS Microfinance, Compartamos Banco, Equity Bank Kenya and Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia) are analyzed. 
 
1.2 SKS Microfinance 
SKS Microfinance was founded in 1998 as a nonprofit organization by Dr Vikram 
Akula, who detected the inability of the nonprofit MFIs to scale to large opera-
tions due to capital constraints. All mayor Indian MFIs operate now on a “for 
profit” model (Kudva 2009). SKS Microfinance is the largest MFI in India with a 
loan book of approximately USD1b and a market share of 25% (Gupta et al 
2010b). 
 
1.2.1 Business Model 
 
SKS Microfinance offers uncollateralized loans to poor borrowers, where has little 
or no recourse in the event of default. SKS risk management tools are: 
 Joint Liability Group.  Borrowers grouped in groups of five in a village. 
The group is jointly responsible for the repayment of individual loans 
which reduces the default rates. (Parameshhwar et al 2010). 
 Village selection. Social and political stability is a factor to enter into a 
village or area 
 Focus on women. SKS believes that women are more risk averse, work 
better in group and prioritize better the needs of the microenterprise and 
the family. 
The main products of SKS Microfinance are the following (Gupta et al 2010a): 
 Income Generation Loan. Provides working capital or asset acquisition to 
start a microenterprise. Loan average amount USD240 and 50 weeks loan 
term. Effective interest rates range from 25% to 30%  (Sen 2010). 
 Medium Term Loans. Similar to the Income Generation Loans but given 
to existing microenterprises in smaller sizes. 
 SKS distributes third party insurance products. The commissions 
obtained from this source reached 10% of the pretax profit in 2010.  
 
1.2.2 Funding 
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SKS Microfinance does not have the authorization from the Indian regulator to 
take deposits from clients. This fact exposes the bank to interbank lending availa-
bility and volatility in the Net Interest Margin and in profitability. SKS funds its 
operations using borrowings from Indian commercial banks. Another key source 
of financing for SKS Microfinance is the securitization market (Gupta et al 
2010b). SKS acts as originator of the loans, loans are ring fenced and securitized, 
de-recognized of the balance sheet of SKS and sold to commercial banks. The 
tranches sold maintain the AAA CRISIL4 rating due to the low historical default 
rate and additionally SKS gives credit guarantees to the securitizations on a per-
centage of the notes. SKS acts as a servicer of the loans, payments collector, doc-
umentation agent and acts as risk manager. At mid 2011 about 30% of the total 
loans originated by SKS Microfinance were sold through the securitization mar-
ket. SKS keeps an initial fee and receives part of the spread through the guaran-
tees. Securitization helps the scalability of the operations of SKS, limits the risk in 
the bank balance sheet and improves the profitability.  
 
1.2.3 Stock Exchange Evolution 
 
SKS was the first MFI to be listed in the Indian market where MFI assets were 
particularly sought after. The price to earnings ratio and the price to book value ra-
tio were particularly high when it was listed, with a P/E of 38.9 just before the 
price fall from 1,360 to 650.  At the end of 2010 the share price of SKS fell signif-
icantly and the P/E was reduced to 12.6 in line with the rest of the listed MFIs.  
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Fig. 1 SKS Stock Price Evolution and Price Regression Analysis Relative to the Sensex Refer-
ence Index. Source Bloomberg. Base 100 in Aug 2010 
 
1.3 Compartamos Banco 
Founded in Mexico in 1990 as an NGO with operations in Chiapas and Oxaca, 
Compartamos is since May 2006 a regulated bank operating in Mexico and Cen-
tral America (Rozeira de Mariz et al 2010a). In June 2007 the bank issued shares 
in a secondary offering in the Mexican stock exchange. In 2011 Compartamos 
                                                            
4 CRISIL: India country credit quality rating agency 
Listed in August 2010
Return (annualized) -85.58%
Market Return (annualized) 33.09%
Beta 48.86%
Alpha -103.45%
Volatility 67.86%
Index Volatility 15.85%
Sharpe Ratio -1.26
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Holding, announced the delisting Compartamos Banco leaving only the holding 
company on the stock exchange in order to accelerate the international expansion 
of the bank.  
 
1.3.1 Business Model 
 
Compartamos Banco is the largest microcredit lender for working capital to mi-
croenterprises in Latin America (Telles et al 2009). The bank had 325 branches at 
the beginning of 2010 and about 7,300 employees (Rozeira de Mariz et al 2010a). 
The bank targets lower income population and microenterprises and uses group 
lending. The bank had USD910m assets at the end of 2010. The average loan is 
MXN5,000 (USD430). The bank focuses primarily on providing financial prod-
ucts to low income women for self employment projects in rural areas. The main 
loan products of Compartamos Banco are the following: 
 Credito Mujer. (75% of Compartamos loan book is Credito Mujer). 
Working capital credit with 16 weeks average tenor, granted to women in 
groups of 12 to 50. Loan amounts range from MXN60 to MXN100,000.  
 Credito Solidario, For men and women, in a group of 3 to 8 people to 
start small business. 
 Credito Individual. Loan granted to owners of small business 
 The MFI uses the Joint Liability Group schema, creating a group of 
women where each group member receives a loan, and all group members are lia-
ble if one member defaults.  
 
1.3.2 Funding 
 
The bank has recently started to accept deposits from clients. Compartamos has 
historically been funded through loans from other Mexican banks. The bank is al-
so funded through long term loans from from international development agencies. 
Compartamos has a very solid equity and Tier I capital (53% of its balance sheet) 
and can access the equity markets for rights issues and equity increases. 
 
1.3.3 Stock Exchange Evolution 
 
The stock performance of Compartamos Bank has been excellent offering an an-
nualized return of 43% since April 2007 although suffering at the beginning of the 
global financial crisis in 2008. At the end of 2010 the Price to Book Value ratio of 
Compartamos was 8.1% and its PE ratio was 17.8%. The regression of the prices 
of Compartamos compared to the reference index, Mexbol, shows a relatively low 
beta and a very good outperformance of the bank compared to the index. The 
Sharpe ratio of Compartamos is close to 1, showing a good risk return profile. 
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Fig. 2 Compartamos Stock Price Evolution and Price Regression Analysis Relative to the Mex-
bol Reference Index. Source Bloomberg. Base 100 in Apr 2007 
 
1.4 Equity Bank Kenya 
Equity Bank was founded as Equity Building Society in October 1984 as a pro-
vider of mortgages for the low income population. EBS operated as an informal 
business and the lack of controls made that by 1993 non-performing loans peaked 
and losses totalled KSh8 33 million. Subsequently the bank was recapitalized and 
in 2004 the bank migrated from a mortgage financing provider to microfinance. In 
August 2006, the bank was listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, with an initial 
valuation of KSh 6.3 billion. Equity Bank operates in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. 
 
1.4.1 Business Model 
 
According to one study conducted in 2006 by Finaccess5 about 38% of adult Ken-
yans had not access to financial services, 19% of Kenyans were served by com-
mercial banks while 8% were served by microfinance institutions, and 35% were 
served by informal financial service providers (from Savings Associations to 
money lenders). In the 2009 Kenya Finaccess study the informal providers had 
diminished to 26.8%. The reduction on the informal creditors is perceived as a so-
cial improvement in Africa (Hoffmann et al 2010). Equity Bank main products are 
micro-loans because it offers a less competitive market and higher margin than 
mortgages. In 2010 Equity Bank had more than 6.3 clients.  The average loan has 
an amount of USD1,142, with an average interest rate of 17.5% (D’souza 2010). 
The bank uses the joint liability group. The bank types of loan products are: 
 Working Loans, for salary advances  
 Micro Agricultural Loans, for farm development 
 Microenterprise Loans, working capital and business growth 
 
1.4.2 Funding 
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Listed in April 2007
Return (annualized) 43.74%
Market Return (annualized) 8.41%
Beta 58.06%
Alpha 37.46%
Volatility 44.58%
Index Volatility 26.52%
Sharpe Ratio 0.98       
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The Kenya Micro-Finance Act (2008) allowed MFI licensed by the Central Bank 
of Kenya to take and mobilize deposits; this had the effect of reducing lending 
rates.  Deposits target to the previously “unbanked” and no commissions are 
charged (commercial banks charge commissions), deposits are competitive com-
pared to the very risky informal deposit saving clubs. Most of the funding required 
by Equity Bank Group comes from customer deposits reaching USD1,294m in 
December 2010. Additionally most of the deposits have long maturities which 
help to manage the funding risk of the MFI. Equity Bank Kenya also received 
long term loans at low fixed interest rates from international development agen-
cies and from the Kenyan government. 
 
1.4.3 Stock Exchange Evolution 
 
Equity Bank has grown at an annualized rate of 130% since August 2006 higher 
than the Kenyan Stock Index. The Price to Book Value ratio was 3.6% at the end 
of 2010, and the Price Earnings ratio was 14% at the end 2010. Equity Bank Ken-
ya has a beta close to 100% with the Kenyan Index. 
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Fig. 3 Equity Bank Stock Price Evolution and Price Regression Analysis Relative to the 
KNSMIDX Reference Index a¡. Source Bloomberg. Base 100 in August 2006 
 
1.5 Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia is today the third largest bank in Indonesia. Founded in 
1895, nationalised in 1945 and until 1983 controlled by the Indonesian Govern-
ment. During the eighties the non performing loans reached 50% of its portfolio 
(Seibel et al 2010). In 1984 with the assistance of the Harvard Institute for Interna-
tional Development and the supervision of the Indonesian Government, the bank 
focused on microfinance. The 1997/98 Asian crisis destroyed most of the banking 
sector in Indonesia but BRI microfinance division resisted (Patten 2001). On No-
vember 2003 the the Indonesian Government listed 40.5% of the bank for 
USD450m. Today BRI is still 57% owned by the Indonesian Government but 
managed independently. BRI is the largest MFI in the world, market cap Decem-
ber 2010 USD4,085m, 37,000 employees and 7,000 branches (Seibel et al 2009). 
Listed in August 2006
Return (annualized) 130.41%
Market Return (annualized) 0.02%
Beta 103.13%
Alpha 130.50%
Volatility 53.14%
Index Volatility 20.60%
Sharpe Ratio 2.45           
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1.5.1 Business Model 
 
Nearly 75% of the loan portfolio of BRI is composed of microcredits, agricultural 
loans and similar assets.  The main products of Bank Rakyat Indonesia are: 
 Microdeposit Simpedes, a savings product with a lottery component. 
 Microcredit Kupedes, multipurpose credit at an average annual interest 
rate of 28%, with monthly repayments. Used for microenterprise working 
capital, agricultural loans or consumer loan. The loans are individually 
granted or using the joint liability schema. 
 Microcredit Kur is a government microcredit for agricultural purposes.  
The bank uses partially the joint liability group schema, but the BRI branches have 
a long presence in the local communities in Indonesia and the social pressure re-
duces the rate of defaults. The bank is considered one of the most profitable banks 
in the world, with an average ROE of average of 36%. 
 
1.5.2 Funding 
 
BRI obtains funding from several sources, among which are the following: 
 Equity raised in the stock markets.  
 Long term loans at very favorable conditions from development agencies  
 The most important source of liquidity for Bank Rakyat Indonesia the 
Simpedes microdeposit schema (Lum et al 2005) that has proved to be a 
reliable source of funding in international credit crisis (1997 and in 
2008). The loans/deposits ratio is close to 75%. 
 
1.5.3 Stock Exchange Evolution 
 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia outperformed the evolution of the Indonesian index from 
November 2003, with an annualized return of 105% whereas the JCI index re-
turned 63%. The Price to Book Value ratio of Bank Rakyat Indonesia was 3.6% at 
the end of 2010 and its PE ratio was 12%.  Bank Rakyat Indonesia has a beta coef-
ficient of 131% and a volatility that nearly doubles the JCI reference index. 
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Listed in November 2003
Return (annualized) 105.57%
Market Return (annualized) 63.65%
Beta 131.83%
Alpha 22.73%
Volatility 47.35%
Index Volatility 25.03%
Sharpe Ratio 2.23             
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Fig. 4 BRI Stock Price Evolution and Price Regression Analysis Relative to the JCI Reference 
Index. Source Bloomberg. Base 100 in January 2004 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The four listed Microfinance Institutions share similar funding sources, concen-
trate on the microenterprises segment and have focused on a previously uncovered 
market segment, providing the lower layer of the society with a new source of 
capital. The four MFIs enjoy a high interest margin and a favorable duration mis-
match. Those common characteristics result in a high ROE, a strong capital base, 
and in most of the cases a high stock price return, a high alpha coefficient and a 
very good Sharpe ratio. The exception is SKS Microfinance that can be explained 
by investors overpaying the August 2010 IPO- The MFI has a solid balance sheet, 
strong ROE and capital ratios in line with its three peers. Equity investors seem to 
prefer MFIs that can take deposits. The four MFIs have been affected by the glob-
al financial crisis but to a lower extent than its respective reference markets. The 
stock markets investors seem to be assigning a premium to the listed MFIs com-
pared to its reference markets due to the fact that these companies are targeting a 
previously unreached segment of the population that needs financial services for 
its development. 
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